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MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, 
and Pentagon Reform
By C h r i s t o p h e r  J .  l a m b ,  m a t t h e w  J .  s C h m i D t ,   
 and b e r i t  g .  F i t z s i m m o n s
Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon’s emphasis on develop­ing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. The debate was highlighted by a series of recent articles in Joint Force Quarterly,1 including one by Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates, who cited the slow fielding of MRAPs as a prime example of the Pen­
tagon’s institutional resistance to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. He personally 
intervened to ensure more than 10,000 MRAPs were fielded quickly. Yet some analysts now 
argue MRAPs are not really useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive.2 As 
General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, “It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we 
were actually managing.”3
Army Chief of Staff reviews photographs of 
vehicle damage caused by IEDs in Afghanistan
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Soldiers in MRAPs clear vegetation that could conceal IEDs 
along roadside in Iraq
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The controversial MRAPs raise two 
questions. First, does the MRAP experience 
support the contention that the Pentagon is 
not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare 
capabilities? Second, what factors best explain 
the MRAP failure, whether that failure is 
determined to be their delayed fielding or the 
fact that they were fielded at all? We conclude 
that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare 
requirement and that the Pentagon should 
have been better prepared to field them, albeit 
not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq. 
We also argue that the proximate cause of 
the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the 
Pentagon’s acquisition system but rather the 
requirements process, reinforced by more 
fundamental organizational factors. These 
findings suggest that acquisition reform is the 
wrong target for advancing Secretary Gates’ 
objective of improving irregular warfare capa-
bilities, and that achieving the objective will 
require more extensive reforms than many 
realize.
IEDs and Armored Vehicles in Iraq
By June 2003, 3 months after the initial 
coalition intervention in Iraq, improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) had emerged as 
the enemy’s weapon of choice. That month, 
then–U.S. Central Command commander 
General John Abizaid, USA, declared IEDs his 
“No. 1 threat.” By December the percentage 
of fatalities caused by IEDs rose to roughly 
half of all U.S. combat deaths, and from the 
summer of 2005 until the spring of 2008, they 
caused 50 to 80 percent of U.S. fatalities (see 
figure 1). The threat evolved over time, but 
all major forms of IEDs were apparent early 
on—by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Initially, the 
enemy tossed charges under moving vehicles 
but soon began using roadside bombs set off 
remotely by electronic devices. As up-armored 
Humvees became more prevalent, insurgents 
buried large bombs in the roads to attack their 
soft underbellies. By early 2005, insurgents 
were using IEDs to conduct both side and 
under-vehicle attacks against the entire range 
of U.S. armored vehicles. They also were using 
a particularly lethal form of IED known as the 
explosively formed penetrator (EFP), which is 
able to better penetrate armor and, in doing 
so, spray elements of the weapons and the 
vehicle armor into the vehicle’s interior. The 
sophisticated EFPs never amounted to more 
than 5 to 10 percent of the IEDs employed by 
insurgents, but they caused 40 percent of IED 
casualties. From spring into summer 2005, 
their use increased from about one per week 
to roughly one every other day.
The IED Challenge and Initial Armor 
Decisions. Field commanders and Washing-
ton also realized early on that IEDs were a 
complex problem requiring a multifaceted 
response. Better armored vehicles would be 
one part of the solution, but there were few 
options readily available. The Army could 
only find about 200 up-armored Humvees 
to deliver to Iraq. Clearly more were needed. 
Two courses of action were taken. First, the 
Army decided to procure more up-armored 
Humvees to replace the thin-skinned ver-
sions. The Army worked with manufactur-
ers to increase production from 51 vehicles 
per month in August 2003 to 400 vehicles 
per month in September 2004, and later to 
550 vehicles per month. Second, the Army 
approved the emergency expedient of adding 
armor kits to the existing Humvees because 
they could be fielded more quickly than the 
up-armored Humvees.
The House Armed Services Commit-
tee (HASC) monitored these efforts and, 
pursuing a mandate from Representative 
Duncan Hunter (R–CA), took it upon itself to 
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s
Explosively formed projectiles arrive
%
 IE
D
-c
au
se
d 
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s
MA
R 0
3
JU
N 
03
SE
P 0
3
DE
C 0
3
MA
R 0
4
SE
P 0
4
JU
N 
04
DE
C 0
4
MA
R 0
5
SE
P 0
5
JU
N 
05
DE
C 0
5
MA
R 0
6
SE
P 0
6
JU
N 
06
DE
C 0
6
MA
R 0
7
SE
P 0
7
JU
N 
07
DE
C 0
7
MA
R 0
8
SE
P 0
8
JU
N 
08
DE
C 0
8
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fatalities
% IED-caused fatalities
Deep-buried IEDs more prominent
The box represents the roughly 2-year period before the 2007 “surge” when U.S. operational strategy 
was to reduce risks to U.S. forces and transfer security responsibilities to Iraq.
Sources: Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, The Iraq Index (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution), available at <www.brookings.edu/FP/saban/iraq/index.pdf>; Defense Manpower Data 
Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, available at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/CASUALTY/OIF-Total-by-month.pdf>; Andrew Feickert, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected 
(MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22707.pdf>; and various reports from Defense News, 
The New York Times, DefenseLink, and The Washington Post.
Figure 1. Percentage of IED-caused Fatalities and Total Fatalities
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by early 2005, insurgents were using improvised explosive 
devices to conduct both side and under-vehicle attacks against 
the entire range of U.S. armored vehicles
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investigate Pentagon claims that production of 
the add­on kits could not be accelerated. The 
HASC staffers shuttled between manufactur­
ers and suppliers, using their private sector 
experience to clear production bottlenecks 
and get the kits into the field. With Congress 
pushing hard, the Pentagon and several Army 
depots increased production from 35 kits 
per month in December 2003 to 600 kits per 
month by July 2004. Consequently, 7,000 kits 
were delivered 6 months ahead of the Penta­
gon’s original timetable. Still, only 5,330 of 
the 8,105 up­armored Humvees required by 
September 2004 were in place.
As the IED problem grew and insuf­
ficient numbers of up­armored Humvees 
were available, innovative U.S. troops began 
adding improvised armor to their vehicles. 
Scrap metal, plywood, and sandbags were 
used to increase protection. The problem was 
highlighted in December 2004 when a Soldier 
complained about the improvised armor to 
then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
in a town hall meeting in Kuwait. The Sec­
retary’s response about “going to war with 
the Army you have” and his further explana­
tion that the lack of armor was a “problem 
of physics” implied nothing could be done 
about the situation, which elicited a firestorm 
of protest from Members of Congress, the 
public, and manufacturers who insisted they 
could increase production to meet the needs 
of U.S. troops.
Within a week of the exchange with the 
Soldier in Kuwait, Secretary Rumsfeld made 
delivery of up­armored Humvees and add­on 
armor kits a priority, and Pentagon officials 
“vowed to eliminate the armored­vehicle 
shortage in Iraq and Afghanistan within six 
months.”4 The Army was compliant but not 
enthusiastic. The Service’s Director of Force 
Development noted both the expense of the 
program (over $4 billion) and the Secretary’s 
determination: “This is an enormously 
expensive program, but very frankly, the com­
munication from the secretary of defense has 
been real clear.”5
The Political Problem. Pressure to do 
more to counter IEDs did not begin with the 
concerned Soldier’s question to Secretary 
Rumsfeld. Representative Hunter and the 
HASC were already on the task. However, the 
incident propelled the armor issue into the 
public consciousness. In Congress, numer­
ous Representatives and Senators from both 
parties complained about the Pentagon’s 
inadequate efforts to supply the troops with 
armor as well as other irregular warfare 
equipment such as body armor and electronic 
jammers. Hunter was particularly active. His 
HASC hearings on military acquisition were 
excruciating for the Pentagon. In an April 21, 
2004, hearing, Hunter related in detail how he 
and his staff also had built a perfectly useable 
up­armored Humvee with help from Home 
Depot. Hunter and his staff were particularly 
incensed that in the President’s budget request 
for fiscal year 2005, the Army had categorized 
the up­armored Humvee and add­on armor 
kits as “unfunded” requirements: “At a time 
when you’re in a war fight and you’ve got 
these IEDs . . . and we’re taking fairly sub­
stantial casualties, why would force protec­
tion, such as up­armor, ever be an unfunded 
requirement?”6
When it became clear that even the 
up­armored Humvees offered insufficient 
protection against IEDs, Senators from across 
the political spectrum, including Ted Stevens 
(R–AK) and Joe Biden (D–DE), weighed in on 
what Missouri Republican Kit Bond decried 
as an unacceptable “set of bureaucratic delays” 
in fielding MRAPs. Media and whistleblower 
exposés, war college studies, congressional 
investigations, and inspector general reports 
castigated Pentagon performance. Legislators 
complained about the inability to “legislate 
a sense of urgency” and withheld funding 
until improvements in armor were made. In 
short, there was sustained political pressure 
to do something about the IED problem and 
provide better vehicular armor to the troops.
Pentagon Organizational Adaptation. 
The Pentagon did not anticipate or prepare 
well for the possibility of postwar disorder. As 
many studies have concluded, senior civilian 
leadership expected U.S. military forces to 
leave Iraq quickly. This proved impossible 
as the insurgency heated up and produced 
casualties that contributed to declining 
American public support for the interven­
tion. As General George Casey, USA, then­
commander of Multi­National Force–Iraq, 
noted in 2004, the enemy intended to use 
IEDs and distribute the images of their effects 
to force the United States to leave Iraq. Pen­
tagon leaders knew that countering IEDs was 
imperative.
In response, a new organization to 
combat IEDs was created. In September 2003, 
at the behest of General Abizaid, the Army set 
up a small unit dedicated to defeating IEDs, 
which adopted the motto: “Stop the bleeding.” 
The task force concentrated on the portion 
of the IED problem “left of the boom”—that 
the enemy intended to use 
improvised explosive devices 
and distribute the images 
of their effects to force the 
United States to leave Iraq
Marines put Cougar H 4x4 MRAP 
through offroad course test
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is, on improving ways to avoid IEDs and 
attacking the ability of insurgents to make, 
emplace, and control the IEDs before they 
went off. The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force 
also put its emphasis on solutions “left of the 
boom.” The following summer, in July 2004, 
the Army­centric task force was upgraded to 
an Army­led Joint Integrated Process Team to 
harness the expertise of all the Services. From 
September 2004 on, the Secretary of Defense 
and Deputy Secretary of Defense issued 
memoranda authorizing expedited procure­
ment of equipment designed to save lives 
and created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
(JRAC) for that purpose. The following year, 
the Pentagon upgraded its efforts to combat 
IEDs by creating the Joint IED Task Force. By 
the time the Joint IED Task Force became the 
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it 
controlled hundreds of personnel and annual 
budgets of more than $3 billion.
The Pentagon organizations dedicated 
to countering IEDs could claim some success. 
IED effectiveness (measured by the ability to 
produce coalition casualties) dropped from 
a high of over 50 percent early in the war to 
less than 10 percent effectiveness by the time 
MRAPs began flowing to theater in the fall of 
2007. Thus, JIEDDO and other counter­IED 
efforts such as up­armored Humvees reduced 
the average effectiveness of an insurgent IED 
attack, thereby forcing insurgents to stage 
more attacks to obtain equivalent effects. 
Unfortunately, the insurgents were able to 
do so and actually to increase their ability to 
inflict U.S. fatalities (see figure 2). Clearly, the 
battle against IEDs was not being won.
In this context, considering better 
armored vehicles was an obvious option, 
but JIEDDO did not push the issue for two 
reasons. First, the organization focused more 
on prevention than protection. The predilec­
tion for working the IED problem left of the 
boom was consistent with an offensive mental­
ity (attacking the IED network) and offered the 
possibility of a more elegant solution if it could 
be achieved. This orientation was so strong 
that some JIEDDO members were dismissive 
of field commanders for wanting to “place 
a cocoon around the soldier driving down 
the street in his vehicle” rather than “taking 
out the IEDs first.”7 Second, JIEDDO did not 
have responsibility for acquisition of better 
armored vehicles. Its mandate allowed it to 
fund development of better armor for MRAPs, 
but it did not have authority to procure and 
sustain better armored vehicles, which was the 
prerogative of the military Services based on 
their assessment of requirements.
MRAP Requirements: The Lost 2 
Years. Field commanders wanted more 
armor in general and MRAPs in particular. 
First, a Military Police commander in Iraq 
issued an urgent request in June 2003 for 
armored security vehicles (ASVs) to help 
protect U.S. military convoys and patrols. 
The ASVs were lighter than the MRAPs that 
were ultimately fielded but similarly designed 
for better protection against mines and other 
ambushes. Also late in the summer of 2003, 
the Army’s 101st Airborne Division issued a 
plea for more vehicle armor and training to 
evade IEDs. In September, other command­
ers began to request MRAPs. By November, 
a draft “urgent universal need statement” for 
MRAPs from a Marine field commander was 
circulating in the Pentagon. The final version, 
sent on February 17, 2005, made the case that 
the Marines should not continue to absorb 
casualties from IEDs when commercial off­
the­shelf MRAPs are available, and that these 
avoidable casualties carried the “potential to 
jeopardize mission success.”8 Despite such 
requests from the field, it took more than 
2 years, political pressure from Congress, 
and a determined intervention by the Sec­
retary of Defense before the JROC validated 
a large purchase of MRAPs as a military 
requirement.
The slow approval of MRAP require­
ments did not reflect lack of appreciation for 
their effectiveness. Early and throughout the 
war, U.S. experts on military requirements 
recommended armored cars and MRAPs for 
Iraqi forces also under attack from IEDs, but 
those in charge of Pentagon requirements did 
not think they were a good fit for the U.S. mili­
tary. An internal Marine Corps report9 found 
that the Marine requirements process largely 
discounted the need for MRAPs. When Marine 
Corps senior leaders convened on March 
29–30, 2005, to consider the need for MRAPs, 
flag officers heard a strong case for their 
immediate purchase from a Marine who had 
long studied their value in irregular warfare. 
The assistant commandant of the Marine 
Corps then “directed the Deputy Commandant 
for Combat Development and Integration to 
review the feasibility of developing or buying a 
new, mine­resistant tactical vehicle to replace 
the [Humvee] and to present the results at the 
next Executive Safety Board meeting.”10 That 
did not happen. Instead, the decision was made 
to hold out for a future vehicle that would meet 
all the requirements for mobility and protec­
tion better than either the up­armored Humvee 
or MRAPs. The Army requirements process 
was even less favorably inclined toward the 
vehicle, always moving more slowly than the 
Marines to approve MRAP requirements and 
in smaller numbers.
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Figure 2: Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP Deployments
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Field commanders persisted, however, 
and in 2006 finally succeeded in getting the 
Pentagon requirements process to approve the 
vehicles. On May 21, 2006, the commanding 
general, Multi­National Force–West, submit­
ted a request for 185 MRAPs to the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 
and in July he submitted a request for 1,000 
more. The eventual approval of the require­
ment for 1,185 MRAPs cleared the way for 
a joint acquisition program, which began 
in November 2006. However, an approved 
MRAP requirement did not guarantee the 
program a high priority, as was soon made 
clear by HASC testimony on March 13, 2007, 
by Generals Robert Magnus, USMC, and 
Richard Cody, USA.
General Magnus acknowledged MRAPs 
are “up to 400 percent more effective than 
the up­armored Humvees in reducing inju­
ries and deaths” and can “cut casualties by 
perhaps as much as two­thirds.”11 Yet just 
as the Services classified armor kits and 
up­armored Humvees as “unfunded require­
ments” in 2004, General Magnus and General 
Cody explained to the dismayed HASC in the 
spring of 2007 that MRAPs were unfunded 
requirements. When General Cody noted 
the Army “did not have a valid requirement 
except for 335 MRAP vehicles when the 
2008 Title IV supplemental was being built,” 
he was interrupted by Representative Gene 
Taylor (D–MS):
But we are getting back to that word require-
ment. And I have pointed out three instances 
where somebody tried to fight this war on the 
cheap [with needless casualties] because of 
body armor, because of Humvees and because 
of jammers. So the question is: Why do we go 
through this again? . . . If this vehicle is going 
to save lives, if Humvees, as we now know, are 
vulnerable to mines and a hugely dispropor-
tionate number of casualties are occurring in 
Humvees because of mines and we have a way 
to address that, why don’t we address it now?
Taylor complained that the Army “seems to 
be dragging their feet.” General Magnus then 
intervened to support General Cody and 
argued that MRAPs were a “rapidly evolving 
requirement over the past three months.”12
Almost 3 years after units in the field 
submitted their requests for MRAPs, the Pen­
tagon requirements system had moved to the 
point where senior Service leadership could 
invite Congress to pay for a large number of 
the vehicles if it was willing to do so over and 
above the Pentagon’s normal budget and its 
warfighting supplemental. Two months later, 
Secretary Gates announced MRAPs were the 
Pentagon’s number­one acquisition priority. 
Shortly thereafter, the JROC validated huge 
MRAP requirements, first for 7,774 and then 
for 15,374 vehicles.
Strategy Significance: The MRAP 
Impact. Fielding MRAPs would have sup­
ported both the U.S. operational strategy 
under General Casey and the substantially 
revised U.S. approach to the insurgency under 
General David Petraeus. With encouragement 
from civilian leadership looking forward to a 
withdrawal of some U.S. forces, Casey’s opera­
tional strategy was to pull U.S. forces back and 
reduce casualties while pushing Iraqi forces 
forward into the fight. Fielding MRAPs would 
have complemented Casey’s strategy well by 
better protecting U.S. forces as they moved to 
and from their protected enclaves, reducing 
political pressure for rapid withdrawal, and 
buying time for the transition to reliance on 
the Iraqi army and police. When MRAPs were 
finally approved as a requirement for U.S. 
forces in mid­2007, General Petraeus’s new 
an approved MRAP requirement did not guarantee the  
program a high priority, as was soon made clear by  
House Armed Services Committee testimony
MRAPs wait to be unloaded from USNS Pililaau at 
Shuaybah Port, Kuwait
U.S. Navy (Kelvin Surgener)
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strategy was just being implemented. He sup­
ported the dispersion of an increasing number 
of U.S. forces (the so­called surge of five addi­
tional Army brigades) among the Iraq popula­
tion, principally in Baghdad. The acquisition 
system was already primed to move quickly 
on MRAPs before the Iraq War began because 
Army engineers had negotiated the Army 
requirements process well enough to obtain 
a handful of MRAP prototypes for clearing 
mines from transportation routes.13 This 
fact, along with the support of Congress and 
Secretary Gates, allowed more than 10,000 
MRAPs to be fielded in record time—about a 
year and a half.
The MRAPs made a significant impact 
once they arrived in theater, but their effect 
was obscured by the decline in violence that 
accompanied the American shift in strategy 
under General Petraeus. In addition to other 
factors such as cooperation with Sunni 
tribal leaders, the surge in U.S. forces and 
General Petraeus’s emphasis on population 
security helped produce a sharp drop in vio­
lence—including IED attacks—from summer 
2007 onward. That drop meant fewer U.S. 
casualties. As expected, American casualties 
(fatalities and wounded) from IED attacks 
dropped even further after MRAPs arrived. 
By the time 10,000 MRAPs were deployed 
in December 2008, the percentage of U.S. 
casualties in Iraq attributable to the IED 
attacks that MRAPs were designed to defend 
against had dropped precipitously. As figure 3 
illustrates, when MRAPs began to flow to Iraq 
in November 2007, almost 60 percent of U.S. 
casualties were attributed to IEDs. Just over 
a year later, with 10,000 MRAPs in country, 
only 5 percent of casualties were attribut­
able to IEDs, even though insurgents were 
targeting the vehicles with IEDs for symbolic 
reasons.14 In short, General Magnus’s testi­
mony in March 2007 to the effect that MRAPs 
could “cut casualties by perhaps as much as 
two­thirds” seems well founded.
It is natural to speculate about the 
impact of fielding MRAPs earlier. Using 
the same MRAP fielding timelines from 
later in the war, and assuming other factors 
are held constant, we can postulate the 
effect if MRAPs had been fielded after the 
receipt of the first urgent needs statement 
in February 2005. Arguably, MRAPs would 
have achieved an even more dramatic reduc­
tion in IED effectiveness earlier in the war 
since other counter­IED efforts were not 
yet bearing fruit. But even the two­thirds 
reduction in IED­related (not total) fatali­
ties postulated by General Magnus in 2007 
would have been dramatic (see figure 4). 
Such a drop in casualties would have reduced 
political pressure for withdrawal and bought 
time for Casey’s strategy of pushing Iraqi 
forces forward, just as it facilitated the strat­
egy of securing the population that General 
Petraeus supported.
explaining Delayed Fielding
The overview of the Pentagon’s record 
on fielding MRAPs corrects some mis­
taken impressions and substantiates some 
popular concerns. The following points bear 
emphasis:
 ■ The Pentagon was poorly prepared for 
irregular warfare and the IED ambush tactics 
it encountered in Iraq.
 ■ The IED threat evolved, but all types 
of IED attacks—side, underbody, and EFP—
were evident by 2004 or 2005 at the latest, so 
the need for better armored vehicles requested 
by commanders in the field was evident.
 ■ While the acquisition system had to be 
pushed to provide armor kits and up­armored 
Humvees faster, the Pentagon did make 
special efforts to address the IED problem.
 ■ Despite huge resources (for example, 
$12.4 billion for JIEDDO from 2006 to 
2008), the new organizations did not have 
the authority to tackle the IED problem in a 
comprehensive manner—particularly where 
armoring vehicles was concerned—and 
instead focused on attacking the precursors to 
IED explosions.
 ■ Senior military leaders only validated 
better armored vehicle requirements under 
pressure from two Secretaries of Defense and 
Congress, despite the demonstrated effective­
ness of better armored vehicles and early 
appeals from field commanders.
 ■ The acquisition system fielded effec­
tive MRAPs quickly once they were approved 
and funded not only because Congress and 
Secretary Gates made them a top priority but 
also because the system had already developed 
and tested MRAP prototypes.
In retrospect, it is clear that the acqui­
sition system was not responsible for the 
Pentagon’s lack of preparedness for irregular 
warfare or its inability to respond quickly 
to the need for better armored vehicles. The 
glaring deficiency was in the Pentagon’s 
requirements system, which requires further 
explanation.
Armored Vehicles and Military 
Requirements. The major tradeoffs between 
MRAPs and lighter tactical vehicles were 
well understood from the beginning. As 
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testimony in March 2007 to 
the effect that MRAPs could 
“cut casualties by perhaps as 
much as two-thirds” seems 
well founded
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Representative Hunter noted, the advantages 
the MRAP has over a Humvee are clear: “It’s 
a simple formula. A vehicle that’s 1 foot off 
the ground gets 16 times that [blast] impact 
that you get in a vehicle that’s 4 feet off the 
ground,” such as the MRAP.15 However, the 
higher clearance and heavier armor also 
make the vehicle less stable and diminish 
mobility, making it impossible to navigate 
narrow urban streets or rough off­road 
terrain. The new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle 
being developed for the rugged terrain of 
Afghanistan, where IED use and effectiveness 
are on the rise, is smaller and designed to 
minimize the tradeoff between mobility and 
survivability. The future vehicle is supposed 
to provide the “same level of protection as the 
previous MRAPs [used in Iraq], but with the 
mobility of a Humvee,”16 which is a difficult 
engineering challenge. Since force protection 
requirements vary from one irregular conflict 
to another, the optimum number and mix of 
armored vehicles, and the way they balance 
mobility, survivability, and other attributes, is 
not self­evident. The relative value of surviv­
ability, mobility, and other armored vehicle 
attributes is a function of multiple factors, 
including the threat posed to U.S. forces, 
which evolved over time.
That said, the evolution of the IED threat 
does not adequately explain the resistance to 
purchasing MRAPs for U.S. forces. First of all, 
the requirements system was slow to validate 
the need for the vehicles even after insurgents 
were using all the major types of IEDs. More­
over, Department of Defense (DOD) experts 
were advising the Iraq military early on that 
they needed MRAPs for counterinsurgency, 
so their value for irregular warfare was under­
stood. The reality is that decisionmakers in 
the Pentagon’s requirements system were not 
enthusiastic about any additional armor, much 
less heavy, expensive MRAPs. Decisions to 
provide additional armor were imposed on the 
system, first by Secretary Rumsfeld and then 
by Secretary Gates. The lack of enthusiasm for 
additional armor was manifest in the argu­
ment made by force development leaders that 
insurgents would simply build bigger IEDs in 
response, and thus “you can’t armor your way 
out of this problem.”17
The contention that additional armor 
is futile because it can be defeated is not a 
good requirements argument. By that logic, 
we would never use armor for any purpose. 
Armor has value not because it is invulnerable 
but because it makes the enemy’s job more dif­
ficult and the tasks of U.S. forces easier. As one 
commander of a division in Baghdad noted, 
MRAPs forced insurgents to build bigger and 
more sophisticated bombs. Those bombs take 
more time and resources to make and set up, 
which gives U.S. forces a better chance of catch­
ing the insurgents in the act. The extra armor 
also boosts the confidence of U.S. troops and 
permits a quick response to ambushes. The 
requirement for MRAPs was acknowledged 
slowly because they are useful primarily for a 
limited defensive purpose in irregular warfare 
campaigns such as Iraq and Afghanistan that 
Service leaders prefer to avoid and hope will 
be short­lived. In this regard, the Pentagon 
requirements system was true to its historical 
mindset, which discounts the importance and 
persistence of irregular warfare.
Irregular Warfare and Force Protec-
tion. Pentagon officials defend the general 
lack of readiness for IEDs by arguing the 
threat could not have been anticipated, but 
the need for better vehicular protection was 
evident long before the intervention in Iraq. 
As is well understood, irregular warriors 
typically hide among noncombatants, so they 
the lack of enthusiasm for 
additional armor was manifest 
in the argument made by 
force development leaders 
that insurgents would simply 
build bigger IEDs in response
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are not easily identified and defeated and use 
ambushes and other hit­and­run tactics to 
bleed and frustrate regular forces. Because 
insurgents are hard to find and use ambush 
tactics, a patient strategy of securing the 
population is required to defeat them. When 
the population feels secure, it is more likely to 
provide information to help locate the insur­
gents and avoid their ambushes.
Yet such a patient strategy requires 
sustained support from the U.S. public, which 
is more likely to offer that support when costs, 
including American casualties, remain low in 
comparison with perceived national interests 
and discernible progress. Since the Iraq War 
was controversial from the beginning and 
progress was not evident, it was particularly 
important to limit casualties. The number of 
Americans who thought the level of U.S. mili­
tary casualties in Iraq was “acceptable” given 
the goals of the war dropped from a slight 
majority in June 2003 to 21 percent by the 
end of 2006.18 Support in Congress declined 
as well, and members of both parties were 
emphatic about the need to give the military 
every possible means of reducing casualties.
Thus, force protection in irregular 
warfare is a strategic imperative because 
costs must be kept low in comparison with 
perceived interests and progress, and it is 
a tactical imperative because hit­and­run 
attacks at close quarters and from any direc­
tion are the norm. This is why counterinsur­
gents historically invest more in key infra­
structure protection, static fortifications to 
protect lines of communication (blockhouses 
or fortified operating bases), and improved 
force protection on the march. Convoys 
that transport and supply the forces that 
constantly pursue the insurgents and protect 
the population must include well­armored 
vehicles that serve as firing platforms to 
quickly counter ambushes.
Lessons from past U.S. participation in 
irregular warfare emphasize the importance 
of force protection and armored mobility.19 
The up­armored Humvee program originated 
with the U.S. intervention in Somalia, but 
soon after U.S. forces left there the program 
was phased out, only to be rushed forward 
again when troops were sent to Bosnia. Both 
of these emergency acquisition efforts waned 
quickly after the intervention. Only the U.S. 
Army Military Police, which specialize in 
population security, showed sustained inter­
est in the up­armored Humvee program and 
ASVs. By the time U.S. forces went to Iraq, 
only 2 percent of the Army’s 110,000 Humvees 
were armored, and only the Military Police 
were equipped with ASVs. For these and other 
reasons, the DOD inspector general’s report 
on MRAPs correctly concluded that DOD 
should have been better prepared to provide 
armored vehicles for irregular warfare.20
Two qualifications may be raised to the 
proposition that the Pentagon should have 
been better prepared for the enhanced vehicu­
lar armor requirements of irregular warfare. 
First, force protection is not an end in itself. 
Instead, “aggressive saturation patrolling, 
ambushes, and listening post operations must 
be conducted, risk shared with the populace, 
and contact maintained.”21 Withdrawing 
inside of large, well­fortified vehicles may 
seem like the tactical equivalent of retreat­
ing to large bases. On the contrary, as the 
new U.S. counterinsurgency manual notes, 
counterinsurgents must treat “every logistic 
package or resupply operation [as] a mounted 
combat operation” and appreciate the need 
for special equipment, including up­armored 
vehicles and specialized mine­clearing equip­
ment (that is, MRAPs).22 A higher level of 
protected mobility for troops conducting 
Soldier views damage to a vehicle caused by 
roadside IED in Baghdad
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counterinsurgency supports rather than 
undermines an aggressive tactical spirit.
The second qualification is that prior 
to Iraq it was not clear that DOD needed to 
invest in a large fleet of MRAPs. As noted, 
determining the optimum number and mix 
of armored vehicles for irregular warfare is 
a difficult requirements problem. However, 
one way to illustrate the extent to which the 
United States should have anticipated the 
force protection requirements in Iraq is by 
comparing the U.S. experience there with the 
performance of other countries. Historically, 
forces well prepared for irregular warfare 
have fielded MRAP variants, but more typi­
cally they have had to compromise between 
better protected armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) with heavier armor and less visibility 
for the occupants and more mobile vehicles 
with better visibility and less protection. Some 
form of armored car variant is typically the 
result. Other national forces deployed to Iraq 
and Afghanistan with better armored car 
variants than the United States, but they too 
were left scrambling for MRAPs.23 If we hold 
ourselves to the standards of other countries, 
the absence of up­armored Humvees, ASVs, 
or other armored car variants prior to Iraq 
is much more difficult to justify than the 
pre­war absence of a large fleet of much more 
expensive and heavy MRAPs.
Once the nature of the IED challenge in 
Iraq became apparent, however, MRAPs should 
have been fielded expeditiously. Instead, the 
Services hoped to get by with less expensive up­
armored Humvees. Adding armor to a Humvee 
costs only $14,000; up­armored Humvees cost 
twice as much as the unarmored version (about 
$200,000), and MRAPs can cost three to seven 
times as much as an up­armored Humvee, 
from $600,000 to over $1 million per vehicle. 
The $25 billion cost projected for MRAPs is 
high but not indefensible. Congress provided 
annual supplemental war funding in the hun­
dreds of billions of dollars, and the overall cost 
of the Iraq War is estimated at over $1.6 tril­
lion. Moreover, the cold­blooded observation 
made by Senators24 and other sources is that 
protecting people in an all­volunteer military 
is cheaper than replacing them. The cost of 
enlisted casualties averages $500,000 each, 
while the cost for officer casualties, depending 
on military occupation, ranges from $1 million 
to $2 million each. Considered in this context, 
and given their value for countering IEDs and 
reducing casualties, MRAPs were more than 
a bargain, and the same is true of up­armored 
Humvees. Yet DOD refused to invest in better 
armored vehicles such as the up­armored 
Humvee before Iraq and was slow to field the 
MRAPs during the conflict. This tendency to 
ignore irregular warfare requirements is not an 
aberration but a persistent trend.
The Pentagon Record on Irregular 
Warfare Requirements. Incredibly, several 
months after the Secretary of Defense 
declared MRAPs the top defense acquisition 
priority, his subordinates were explaining 
to Congress that MRAPs would be put in 
storage because “Service chiefs have indi­
cated that these are heavy, large vehicles that 
might not fit well with mobile expeditionary 
missions.”25 The observation that MRAPs 
will not be a good fit for future conflicts 
is odd since DOD strategy and planning 
guidance has long insisted irregular warfare 
will be a major element of the future threat 
environment. The perspective of the Service 
chiefs is at odds with national security 
policy and defense planning, but it is entirely 
consistent with historic Service positions in 
the Pentagon’s longstanding debate over the 
nature and precise definition of irregular 
warfare capabilities.
incredibly, several months after the Secretary of Defense declared 
MRAPs the top defense acquisition priority, his subordinates were 
explaining to Congress that MRAPs would be put in storage
Soldiers install up-armored kits on 
Humvees in Afghanistan
U.S. Army (Marcus J. Quarterman)
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This debate heated up in response to 
the war on terror, figured prominently in the 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and was 
further elevated by Secretary Gates, who made 
the case publicly that the Pentagon is unable 
to generate a proper balance of conventional 
and irregular warfare capabilities. To correct 
this shortcoming, Secretary Gates issued a 
policy directive that declares irregular warfare 
is just as important as traditional warfare and 
that the military must be equally proficient 
at both; then he promulgated a new defense 
strategy that emphasizes irregular warfare 
capabilities; then he followed up by announc­
ing the termination or reduction of some 
major weapons programs to pay for more 
irregular warfare capabilities. Yet past experi­
ence suggests that it will be difficult to thrust 
irregular warfare capabilities on the Services.
When pressed to invest in irregular 
warfare, the Services argue equipment should 
be equally effective in all types of conflicts. In 
the case of armored vehicles, the argument is 
made that those currently under development 
will meet all future requirements, including 
those for irregular warfare. Thus, the emerg­
ing preference is for “scalable armor” added 
to an all­purpose chassis that bears up well 
regardless of the levels of armored protection 
it carries. Such versatility is desirable but of 
course difficult to achieve. When circum­
stances demand the urgent procurement of 
irregular warfare equipment, such capabilities 
typically are abandoned shortly after the con­
flict fades from memory. This happened with 
up­armored Humvees and, before that, with 
slower fixed­wing aircraft for reconnaissance 
and close fire support as well as brown and 
green water vessels that patrol coastlines and 
inland waterways. The likely prognosis for 
MRAPs would be the same absent interven­
tion by the Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Gates wants to “institution­
alize procurement of [irregular] warfare 
capabilities” so they can be quickly fielded 
when needed. The source of resistance to this 
goal is not the Pentagon’s acquisition system. 
As acquisition professionals emphasize and 
the MRAP experience illustrates, it is impos­
sible to procure anything without a validated 
requirement and congressional funding. 
Once senior leadership validated the require­
ment and provided resources, the acquisition 
system fielded large numbers of MRAPs 
within 18 months—an accomplishment 
often described as an industrial feat not seen 
since World War II. Instead, the long delay 
in fielding MRAPs is attributable first to the 
Pentagon’s force development or requirements 
system, second to Service cultures that gener­
ally undervalue irregular warfare capabilities, 
and finally to the Pentagon’s decisionmaking 
structure and processes, which typically favor 
specialization over integration of diverse areas 
of expertise to solve complex problems. Secre­
tary Gates seems to appreciate the complexity 
of the problem. He has argued, “In the end, 
the military capabilities we need cannot be 
separated from the cultural traits and reward 
structure of the institutions we have.”26 Hope­
fully, the Secretary’s broader understanding 
of the problem—and hence the proper scope 
of required reform—will not get lost in the 
rush to revise the current defense program or 
reform the acquisition system.  JFQ
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